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CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
by Richard D. Friedman 
University of Michigan 
On June 9, by granting certiorari in 
Crawford v. Washington, 02-9410, the 
Supreme Court signaled its intention to enter 
once again into the realm of the Confrontation 
Clause, in which it has found itself deeply 
perplexed. This time there was a difference, 
however, because the grant indicated that the 
Court might be willing to rethink its 
jurisprudence in this area. 
Crawford, like Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 
(1986), and Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 
(1999), presents a classic case of what might 
be called station-house testimony. Michael 
Crawford was accused of stabbing another 
man. His wife, Sylvia, was present at the 
scene, and later that evening made a recorded 
statement to the police, in the station-house. 
In context, the statement was damaging to 
Michael's contention of self-defense. Sylvia 
was unavailable to testify at trial.' 
Accordingly, the prosecution offered the 
station-house statement. It was admitted over 
Michael's objection that it violated his right 
"to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.". Michael was convicted, and eventually 
the Washington Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction. It deemed Sylvia's statement to be 
sufficiently reliable to withstand scrutiny under 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), because 
it "interlocked" to a significant degree with a 
station-house statement made by Michael 
himself. 
The petition for cerriorari posed two 
questions. One was a narro\\,: one, \Vithin the 
1 Formally, Michael asserted the spousal 
privilege that Washington law affords him, 
but this does not appear to affect the case, 
and has barely been mentioned in the papers 
before the Supreme Court; it is apparent that 
Sylvia, who later pied guilty to a charge 
arising out of the incident, was unwilling to 
testify against Michael, and she could have 
refused on the basis of her privilege against 
self-incrimination. 
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Roberts rubric, addressing the admissibility of 
a statement interlocking with one made by the 
accused. The chief interest of the case, 
though, lies with the second question: 
Whether this Court should reevaluate the 
Confrontation Clause framework 
established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 
(1980), and hold that the Clause 
unequivocally prohibits the admission of 
out-of-court statements insofar as they are 
contained in "testimonial" materials. such 
as tape-recorded custodial statements. 
The certiorari grant was unqualified, and the 
petitioner's brief concentrates primarily on the 
second question. So do two amicus briefs filed 
in support of the petitioner - one for the 
National A.ssociation of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers. the American Civil Liberties Union. 
and the ACLU's Washington affiliate, and the 
other by me for eight other law professors and 
myself. By the way, the State did us a favor by 
not consenting to us file these briefs. As far as 
I was concerned that did us a big favor. It 
meant that I could include nice biographical 
sketches of the signers of our brief in a motion 
for leave to file - which I am relieved to sav 
the Court has granted - without it counting 
against our page limit: the statement of interest 
in the brief itself just referred to the motion. 
Under Roberts. any hearsay by an out-of-
court declarant poses a potential confrontation 
problem. If the statement is deemed reliable 
- a conclusion that may be drawn if the 
statement fits within a "firmly rooted" hearsay 
exception it is usually admissible 
nevertheless, though in the case of former 
testimony and perhaps some other statements 
the hearsay is still not admissible unless the 
declarant is unavailable to testify at trial. This 
framework is utterly unsupported by the text of 
the Confrontation Clause, which does not refer 
to hearsay or reliability, and by its history. The 
history of the Clause makes clear that it was 
meant to ensure that - in contrast to some 
systems used on the European Continent and 
courts like the Star Chamber that followed 
their model - witnesses against a criminal 
defendant were brought "face to face" with the 
accused, at trial ifreasonably possible, to give 
their testimony. The scope of the ~lause 
therefore is limited to statements that by their 
nature are testimonial. The exact bounds of 
the category of testimonial statements may not 
be exact, but the essence is clear: If a statement 
is made in circumstances in which a 
reasonable person would realize that it would 
likely be used (if allowed) as evidence in a 
criminal prosecution, then it is testimonial, for 
the declarant is knowingly creating evidence. 
Station-house statements are paradigmatic 
examples of the focus of the Clause -
testimonial statements made without 
confrontation. 
If the scope of the Clause is limited to 
testimonial statements, there is no need to ring 
it with exceptions. Just like the rights to a jury 
and to counseL the right to confront witnesses 
should be regarded as absolute within its 
bounds. not to be overcome by a judgment that 
it is not necessary in the particular case 
because the evidence against the accused is so 
strong. The right can be waived or forfeited. 
however. Thus, if the reason that a witness 
cannot testify against an accused at trial is that 
the accused killed the witness, the accused has 
forfeited his right to prevent a statement by the 
witness form being admitted on confrontation 
grounds, whether the fatal blow was struck 
before or after the witness made the statement. 
So that is a very short summary of one (my) 
version of the testimonial approach. The 
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State's brief is, frankly, rather lackadaisical. It 
contends, for example, that there is no basis 
for rendering all hearsay inadmissible-but of 
course nobody has advocated that position. 
Far more interesting is an amicus brief 
submitted the Solicitor General's Office 
In White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), the 
Government advocated something like the 
testimonial approach, and now it does so 
again, with a clearer emphasis on the 
testimonial nature of statements that are 
covered by the Clause. But now the 
Government contends that, even ifa statement 
is testimonial but the accused has not had an 
opportunity for confrontation. it may 
nevertheless be admitted if the witness is 
unavailable and the statement is deemed 
reliable. 
One might say that this prosecutorial-minded 
argument seeks to take the bitter without the 
sweet - it seeks to limit the scope of the 
Confrontation Clause as defined by Roberts 
but not to bolster the force of the Clause within 
the reduced scope. For at least three reasons, 
I believe it would be most unfortunate to 
couple adoption of the testimonial approach 
with retention of reliability analysis for 
unavailable witnesses. 
( 1) Results: So far as I am aware. there never 
has been a case in \vhich the Supreme Court 
has allowed use of a testimonial statement that 
was made without the accused having had an 
opportunity for cross-examination. Reliability 
rhetoric has been a way of allowing in non-
testimonial statements, which should not be 
covered by the Clause in the first place. If, as 
I believe, the testimonial approach is 
compatible with all the results of Supreme 
Court precedents (though not with their 
language), then the only impact of retaining 
reliability testing can be to reduce the right. 
(2) Principle: If a live witness at trial becomes 
unavailable before cross, the response of our 
adjudicative system is not, "Oh well, let the 
jury use the evidence for what it's worth." 
Rather, the evidence is struck. Why is there 
any better case for allowing use of the 
evidence if the testimonial statement is made 
and the unavailability occurs before trial? If 
anything, this is the \Veaker case, because it 
does not present the situation in which the 
testimony has already been heard by the jury 
before the problem occurs. 
(3) Problems unsofred: Retaining reliability 
testing for unavailable declarants would retain 
most of the unpredictability and vulnerability 
to manipulation that has characterized the 
Roberts approach. It would be similarly 
unjustified by the text or history of the Clause. 
The problems might be somewhat confined -
to justify bringing non-testimonial statements 
outside the Confrontation bar. we would not 
have to make specious statements about their 
reliability - but where they existed. in the 
domain of testimonial statements. they \\ould 
be no less troublesome than under the current 
frame\vork. 
The case is scheduled for argument on 
November 10 probably before this 
newsletter reaches its audience. I am 
scheduled to sit at counsel table with the 
petitioner's lawyer, Jeffrey Fisher, an 
extremely able advocate who is, I am glad to 
say, an alum of the University of Michigan 
Law School. I confess that I am very excited 
by the prospect that this case offers for 
rediscovering the essence of one of the central 
rights of our system of criminal justice. 
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